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The Tripartite Determinism of Hungarian
Foreign Policy
After the 1956 revolution, Hungarian foreign policy was determined not
simply by dependence on the Soviet Union but by a more complex system
of tripartite determinism. Although affiliation with the Soviet bloc imposed
tight restrictions, Hungary’s dependence on Western advanced technology,
trade contacts, and hard-currency loans engendered another strong bond. At
the same time, Hungarian foreign policymakers had to perform a balancing
act to pursue specific national objectives by engaging in an “all-East-Central-
European lobby-contest.”1 Although the tripartite determinism of Hungarian
foreign policy had always existed in some form, the relative importance of the
three factors converged in the mid-1960s. This same arrangement applied in
large part to the entire Soviet bloc. The three factors also drove Hungarian,
Polish, Romanian, East German, and (to a lesser extent) Czechoslovak and
Bulgarian foreign policy, particularly from the mid-1960s onward.2
Hungary in its relationship with the Soviet Union—even after the sudden
replacement of Ja´nos Ka´da´r’s patron, Nikita Khrushchev, by Leonid Brezhnev
in October 1964—played the role of a loyal, dependable, and predictable part-
ner until 1989. Two main factors justified Ka´da´r’s conviction that a staunchly
pro-Soviet political line would be most advantageous. One was the exigency of
bolstering Western economic relations, insofar as these relations were pivotal
to the modernization of the Hungarian economy. In the 1960s, this pro-
cess demanded confirmation of Hungary’s unswerving loyalty as well as the
1. For an archive-based analysis of Hungarian foreign policy under Ja´nos Kadar, see Csaba Be´ke´s,
“Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Soviet Alliance System, 1968–1989,” Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 2,
No. 1 (2004), pp. 87–127.
2. For the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Western relationship meant, above all, their
unique and highly controversial relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).
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indivisibility of the bloc, as Brezhnev emphasized at a meeting of the Warsaw
Pact’s Political Consultative Committee (PCC) in Warsaw in January 1965:
“The imperialists are trying to extend their contacts to the socialist countries
to influence their domestic lives in a direction favorable to them and to under-
mine their unity by offering economic, technological, and scientific incentives.
Hence, it is of the utmost importance to prevent their ideological penetration
and subversive endeavors.”3
A second and equally important factor involved the preparations for re-
forming the Hungarian economy. Economic reform proved to be the most
significant structural change in the Soviet bloc since the establishment of the
Stalinist command economic system. Hungarian leaders believed it was essen-
tial to reassure Soviet officials that reforms would apply solely to the economy.
Hence, Hungarian foreign policy aimed, in light of Hungarian-Soviet rela-
tions, to apply the policy of “constructive loyalty.”4 The main features of this
approach were conflict prevention, credibility, predictability, and flexibility
with regard to political issues, as well as adjustment to Soviet requirements
and a willingness to cooperate with Moscow. Throughout this period, Hun-
gary played a mediating role in the Warsaw Pact, the Council of Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA), and multilateral negotiations in support of
long-standing Soviet goals. The “constructive” aspect of Hungary’s loyalty im-
plied that despite all these factors, the constraints could be and in fact were
continually tested and gradually loosened. The implication of this principle
until the late 1980s was that “what is not forbidden is (perhaps) allowed.”
Another important aspect of Hungary’s foreign policy was that Hungarian
leaders, by gaining credibility through loyalty, had leeway to try to influence
Soviet policymakers and achieve concessions within the framework of bilateral
relations, which served the concrete interests of Hungary as well as the other
East-Central European countries in most cases. Hungary’s overtures did not
always yield results, but in numerous instances Hungarian leaders were able to
exercise positive influence on the Soviet Union with respect to fundamental
issues affecting East-West relations.
Constructive loyalty yielded another result as well. Because the fundamen-
tal long-term aims of Hungarian authorities after 1956 necessitated the main-
tenance of relatively independent domestic development, Soviet-Hungarian
economic relations—first and foremost, the guarantee of an uninterrupted sup-
ply of Soviet raw materials and energy supplies at a “friendly” price to sustain
3. Minutes of the session of the MSzMP Political Committee, 26 January 1965, in Magyar Nemzeti
Leve´lta´r Orsza´gos Leve´lta´ra (MNL-OL), M-KS. 288, F. 5/237. o˝rze´si egyse´g (o˝.e.).
4. Be´ke´s, “Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Soviet Alliance System,” p. 89.
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industrial production—were of paramount importance. In exchange for pre-
venting overt political conflict with Hungary, Soviet leaders, in most cases,
turned a blind eye when Hungarian negotiators were extremely tough bargain-
ing partners during bilateral economic talks. On the whole, the Hungarians
managed to extract economic concessions in return for political cooperation.
Starting in the early 1960s, Hungary’s economic needs induced officials
in Budapest to seek closer ties with the West. The basis of this drive was their
realization that only a functioning and gradually growing economy and higher
standards of living would ensure political stability, as set out in the Ka´da´rist
social contract. Rapidly advancing modern technology gained an ever-growing
role in the emerging global economic environment. However, Hungary had to
look to Western countries for technology because Soviet technology, with the
exception of military equipment and space research, lagged behind the West
from the 1950s on, and the gap steadily widened.5
Because Hungary lacked most types of raw materials and energy resources,
its economy was one of the most open in the Soviet bloc and was reliant on
foreign trade to a great extent. Because the bulk of Hungary’s foreign trade was
conducted with CMEA countries, the ever-growing need for hard currency (to
pay for imports from the West), as well for loans, became a driving force behind
Hungary’s efforts to deepen its economic and trade relations with capitalist
states, especially in Western Europe.
Western trade restrictions against the Eastern bloc via the Coordinating
Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) reinforced Hungarian
leaders’ desire to improve relations with the West in the hope of having the
restrictions lifted. Consequently, from the mid-1960s on, Hungary—within
the prevailing limits of Soviet tolerance—intensively broadened relations with
West European countries and became one of the main proponents of East-West
rapprochement.
The Beginning of the CSCE Process and the
Challenge of Ostpolitik, 1965–1969
By the mid-1960s, the German question had resulted in a division of the Soviet
bloc into an economy-oriented sub-bloc (consisting of Hungary, Romania,
and Bulgaria) and a security-concerned sub-bloc (East Germany, Poland, and
5. For a recent archive-based monograph on the functioning and the transformation of the Soviet-
style system in Hungary, see Melinda Kalma´r, To¨rte´nelmi galaxisok vonza´sa´ban: Magyarorsza´g e´s a
szovjetrendszer, 1945–1990 (Budapest: Osiris Kiado´, 2014).
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Czechoslovakia).6 The countries in the first group had no serious unsettled
issues with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and were interested in
economic cooperation, an expansion of trade, and the acquisition of cutting-
edge technologies. They were thus the ones that most regretted the lack of
diplomatic relations with the FRG. They found it increasingly difficult to
remain in line with the security-concerned sub-bloc, which perceived West
Germany as a security threat. Their inability to establish diplomatic relations
with their most important Western economic partner seemed incongruous.7 In
the case of Hungary, by the beginning of the 1960s, around 30 percent of the
country’s foreign trade was conducted with Western countries; one-quarter of
that was with the FRG. West Germany was Hungary’s most important Western
economic partner from the mid-1950s on and remained so until 1989.8
Thus, the FRG played a crucial role in rebuilding Hungary’s economic ties
with Western countries. The West German–Hungarian relationship was mo-
tivated by several important factors, such as geographic proximity, surviving
traditional economic links, wide command of the German language among
Hungarian experts, and even a standardization system based on the German
model.9 On the other hand, in the Soviet bloc’s propaganda of the early 1960s,
the FRG was portrayed as the most dangerous European “satellite” of the U.S.
imperialists and a revanchist power seeking to obtain nuclear weapons and a
revision of the 1945 European status quo. Thus, Hungarian leaders followed
a dual policy: With regard to security aspects of the German question, they
loyally followed the general political line of the Soviet bloc. But on economic re-
lations, they tried to exploit the favorable situation that evolved with the emer-
gence of de´tente after 1953 and especially 1955.10 For this purpose, the year
6. Csaba Be´ke´s, “The Warsaw Pact, the German Question and the Making of the CSCE Process,
1961–1970,” in Gottfried Niedhart and Oliver Bange, eds., The CSCE 1975 and the Transformation
of Europe (New York: Berghahn, 2008), pp. 113–114.
7. Most likely, this intra-bloc conflict was at least partly responsible for the failure of the Soviet initiative
for the normalization of relations between the FRG and the East-Central European countries in one
way or another, parallel to the process of establishing diplomatic relations between Moscow and Bonn
in 1955. To be on the safe side, Hungarian leaders adopted a resolution in July 1955 stipulating that
Hungary—depending on the outcome of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s forthcoming negotiations in
Moscow—should enter into diplomatic relations with the FRG. See ibid., p. 125.
8. Report by Ja´nos Ka´da´r at the MSzMP Central Committee plenum, 10 August 1961, in MNL-OL,
M-KS. 288, F. 4/42. o˝.e.
9. For a survey of Hungarian-FRG relations, see La´szlo´ J. Kiss, “Az elso˝ a´llamko¨zi mega´llapoda´sto´l
a diploma´ciai kapcsolatok felve´tele´ig: A magyar-nyugatne´met kapcsolatok egy e´vtizede: 1963–1973,”
Ku¨lpolitika, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1976), pp. 40–64.
10. For a detailed explication of my concept of de´tente, see Csaba Be´ke´s, “Cold War, De´tente, and the
1956 Hungarian Revolution,” in Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood, eds., The Cold War after Stalin’s
Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace? (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp. 213–233. I
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1963 proved to be a watershed for Hungary. In December 1962 the “problem
of Hungary” was finally removed from the agenda of the United Nations (UN)
General Assembly after a secret deal between the United States and Hungary.
This was followed by the visit of UN Secretary General U Thant to Budapest
in July 1963.11 Thant’s visit was symbolic, in effect terminating the period
of Hungary’s diplomatic isolation after the 1956 Hungarian revolution and
Soviet invasion. In the fall of 1963, as a result of negotiations initiated by the
FRG in April 1962, commercial missions were mutually established between
West Germany and Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania—a spectacular
result that ushered in a new chapter in Hungarian–West German relations.12
Within the Soviet bloc, positions on European security—especially on
the German question—were roughly the same as those concerning economic
ties. Hungary conducted a specific type of pragmatic politics within the bloc,
determined by the country’s ultimate interests. Efforts to foster de´tente became
an important priority for Hungarian leaders from the mid-1960s onward. One
of Hungary’s prime foreign policy goals was to ensure that the de´tente process
would be irreversible.
The first policy paper on Hungary’s international relations reflecting this
determination was prepared just half a year after the PCC’s Bucharest declara-
tion in July 1966.13 In January 1967, Foreign Minister Ja´nos Pe´ter submitted
a comprehensive proposal to the Political Committee (Politikai Bizottsa´g) of
the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (Magyar Szocialista Munka´spa´rt, or
MSzMP) calling for Hungary to play an important role in the intensifica-
tion of the de´tente process and the far-reaching improvement of East-West
relations.14 To facilitate the convening of a European security conference, Pe´ter
argue that the rapprochement process from 1953 to 1956, far from being just a promising but misfired
attempt to establish de´tente (as generally depicted), was a major landmark that caused a decisive change
in East-West relations.
11. On the secret U.S.-Hungarian talks, see Ja´nos Radva´nyi, Hungary and the Superpowers: The 1956
Hungarian Revolution and Realpolitik (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1972); and La´szlo´ Borhi,
Iratok a magyar-amerikai kapcsolatok to¨rte´nete´hez: 1957–1967 (Budapest: Ister, 2002).
12. On the talks between the FRG and Hungary in 1962–1963, see Miha´ly Ruff, “A Magyar-NSZK
kapcsolatok 1960–1963: U´tkerese´s a doktr´ına´k u´tveszto˝je´ben,” Mu´ltunk, Vol. 44, No. 3 (1999), pp.
3–40. In the case of Hungary and Poland, a Polish and a Hungarian commercial bureau had already
operated in Frankfurt since 1946. An agreement in 1963 allowed the FRG to open similar missions in
Budapest and Warsaw that were each given diplomatic status.
13. For a detailed account of the Soviet bloc’s policy on European security issues, see Csaba Be´ke´s, “The
Warsaw Pact and the Helsinki Process: 1965–1970,” in Wilfried Loth and Georges-Henri Soutou, eds.,
The Making of De´tente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War: 1965–75 (London: Routledge,
2008), pp. 201–220.
14. Memorandum from Ja´nos Pe´ter to the MSzMP Political Committee on issues of European peace,
security, and cooperation, 17 January 1967, in MNL-OL, M-KS. 288, F. 5/415. o˝.e.
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proposed establishing intensive official and personal contacts primarily with
Austria, Great Britain, and France, but also with other West European coun-
tries such as Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. The most
radical component of the proposal was the establishment of a framework for
close cooperation among “the countries of the Danube Valley and the Central
European states” (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Austria).
In all probability, Pe´ter was the only Hungarian foreign minister from
1945 through 1989 who considered his post to be more than a political
function bound to professional circumstances. His “Danube Valley” idea was
almost expressly aimed at rebuilding the regional ties of the former Austro-
Hungarian monarchy, which had once proved to be a rational and effective
model of cooperation. Thus, by early 1967, Pe´ter was already capable of
prognosticating a transformation of East-West relations radical enough to
make close cooperation possible between states from opposing social systems.
Pe´ter, who probably considered lobbying for this idea to be his personal
mission, had made numerous attempts to convince Soviet leaders of this up
to the early 1970s, using the rationale (among others) that a neutral Austria
might be drawn closer to the Eastern bloc.15 Although de´tente resulted in an
unprecedented rapprochement between the two camps in the following years,
the “Danube Valley” idea was not acceptable to Moscow either then or later.
Soviet leaders instinctively worried about the potential negative consequences
of any specific East-Central European regional coordination that did not
include the USSR.
Nonetheless, the plan of January 1967 unambiguously signaled the desire
of Hungarian foreign policymakers to participate actively and in an innovative
way in the process of transforming East-West relations. After the PCC’s decla-
ration in Bucharest in July 1966, Hungarian diplomats—with encouragement
from the Soviet Union—launched a large-scale campaign to initiate bilateral
negotiations with West European partners, promoting the idea of a European
security conference. From 1966 to 1969, talks were conducted with numerous
states at the level of foreign ministers, deputy foreign ministers, and foreign
policy experts. In March 1968, the first visit by a Hungarian prime minister to
Western Europe took place since 1946: Jeno˝ Fock conducted talks with French
President Charles de Gaulle and Prime Minister Georges Pompidou in Paris.
The Soviet Union’s decision in the mid-1960s to seek improvements in
East-West relations thus coincided fully with the interests of Hungarian leaders.
15. Report to the MSzMP Political Committee and to the government on the visit of Foreign
Minister Ja´nos Pe´ter to the Soviet Union, 22–29 December 1969, 6 January 1970, in Foreign Ministry
(henceforth KU¨M), MNL-OL, XIX. J-1-j-Szu-00949–1/1970.
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The explicit purpose of the Soviet bloc’s campaign was an all-encompassing
effort to set in motion one of the most important strategic targets of the
period—namely, the staging of a European security conference that would
legitimize the post-1945 European status quo. Meanwhile, by pursuing bilat-
eral negotiations, the East-Central European states, including Hungary, could
“legally” augment their ties with the West and acquire negotiating experience
they had never had before. From then on, as the Soviet Union attempted
to advance the role of its allies in world politics, Soviet leaders came to re-
gard them as partners, albeit in a limited sense. This development resulted
in unprecedented international activities for some of the East-Central Euro-
pean countries—namely, Poland, Hungary, and Romania—which in turn en-
hanced their standing both within their own alliance and in East-West relations
generally.
Hungary’s role in the Eastern bloc thereby received a lasting boost. Al-
though Hungary started at a serious disadvantage because of 1956, this handi-
cap had disappeared by the mid-1960s, and the country became a model state
for the West because of its de-Stalinization and relative internal liberalism. The
Hungarian government’s increasingly important role in international politics
was strengthened further in 1968 when Hungary became a non-permanent
member of the UN Security Council for two years. Despite Ka´da´r’s decision
to take part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Western coun-
tries continued to judge Hungary by its earlier performance. Hence, Hungary
gradually assumed an important position alongside Romania and Poland in
seeing improvements in East-West relations and pushing for a European secu-
rity conference. Hungary’s role was enhanced by the inception of the country’s
“New Economic Mechanism,” launched in January 1968, which was favor-
ably perceived in the West as a shift toward a more market-oriented economy.
Meanwhile, the anti-Semitic campaign that emerged in Poland after the 1967
war in the Middle East indisputably damaged the international standing of
the Polish government.
A Missed Opportunity: The Challenge of
Establishing Diplomatic Relations with
the FRG, 1966–1968
When the resolution of the German question emerged at PCC meetings in
January 1965 and July 1966, Hungarian leaders loyally adopted the Soviet po-
sition and fully supported efforts to gain international recognition of the Ger-
man Democratic Republic (GDR). However, the joint Warsaw Pact position
7
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worked out at the Bucharest PCC conference was interpreted by Hungarian
officials as a call for opposing the FRG’s Hallstein Doctrine, which sought to
isolate the GDR.
Consequently, when the new Grand Coalition government in West Ger-
many headed by Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt
initiated secret preliminary talks with four countries (Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary, Romania, and Bulgaria) in December 1966 in an attempt to establish
diplomatic relations, Hungarian leaders were eager to respond positively.16
This step signaled a radical turning point in the foreign policy of the FRG
insofar as it would lead to the abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine and a
victory for the Soviet bloc. In return for this significant concession, the West
Germans asked the four countries to consider the “Moscow model” as the
basis for establishing official relations without preconditions—a model in line
with the FRG’s long-standing position on the German question. In October,
Hungarian leaders backed the Polish leader Władysław Gomułka in urging
the PCC to hold a consultative meeting on European security, but Roma-
nia’s opposition prevented it.17 Hence, the East European countries pursued
separate policies while seeking to harmonize their standpoints with Moscow
Hungarian leaders informed the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states
about the negotiations with the FRG but received ambiguous responses, if
any. Nonetheless, no country, not even the GDR, flatly rejected the Hungar-
ian position. The lack of a negative reply was construed by Hungarian officials
as outright approval. The MSzMP Political Committee adopted a resolution
on 10 January 1967 to begin official negotiations with the FRG.18 On the
basis of this authorization, Rolf Lahr, a senior West German Foreign Ministry
official, conducted negotiations in Hungary from 23 to 26 January 1967, and
Hungarian leaders were ready to establish diplomatic relations.
Soviet leaders at the time also favored moving ahead on the basis of the
“Moscow model.” However, East German and Polish leaders reacted with alarm
and immediately began to lobby Moscow to block the plan.19 At a meeting in
eastern Poland in late January 1967, Gomułka tried to pressure Brezhnev by
16. For a detailed account of the Warsaw Pact’s policy concerning the German question, see
Be´ke´s, “The Warsaw Pact, the German Question and the Making of the CSCE Process,” pp. 113–
128.
17. MSzMP Political Committee resolution of 27 October 1966 agreeing to this proposal, in MNL-
OL, M-KS. 288, F. 5/408. o˝.e.
18. Minutes of the MSzMP Political Committee, 10 January 1967, in MNL-OL, M-KS. 288, F.
5/414. o˝.e.
19. Oliver Bange, “Ostpolitik und De´tente: Die Anfa¨nge 1966–1969,” Habilitation Diss., Mannheim
University, 2004, pp. 73–78, 136, 257.
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threatening that such a move would lead to the disintegration of the Warsaw
Pact. He told Brezhnev that if the Soviet Union did not prevent the allies from
proceeding, a meeting of the PCC should be convened. Brezhnev finally gave
in, promising that within a few days an extraordinary meeting of the Warsaw
Pact foreign ministers would deal with the matter.20 Before this step could
be taken, however, Romania suddenly announced on 31 January—without
any consultation with its Warsaw Pact allies—that it would be establishing
diplomatic relations with the FRG.
The Romanian move was harshly criticized in the GDR press, and an
unprecedented public debate ensued between East Berlin and Bucharest. In
the face of this intrabloc crisis, an extraordinary meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign
ministers was convened in Warsaw.21 Pe´ter, as Hungarian foreign minister, took
part with instructions that, for tactical reasons, the establishment of diplomatic
relations with the FRG might have to be postponed as a consequence of
Romania’s unilateral step. At the same time, Pe´ter argued that the Warsaw
Pact should reach agreement on how the other member-states could establish
diplomatic relations at a somewhat later time—perhaps in a few months’
time. This idea fell by the wayside under relentless pressure from the GDR
and Poland, with Soviet assistance. Instead of adopting Hungary’s flexible
tactical proposal, the participants embraced a secret protocol that came to be
called the “Warsaw diktat.”
The protocol stated that for the East European countries that had not
yet established diplomatic relations with the FRG, conditions were no longer
suitable for proceeding unless the West Germans fulfilled six preconditions:
(1) renunciation of the principle of sole representation of the German nation;
(2) recognition of the GDR; (3) recognition of existing borders—including
the Oder-Neisse line; (4) recognition of West Berlin’s special status and its
independence from the FRG; (5) renunciation of the possession of nuclear
weapons; and (6) recognition of the invalidity of the Munich agreement ab
initio.22 East German and Polish officials insisted that the FRG could (with due
persistence) be forced to recognize the GDR within a few years, renouncing
20. Douglas Selvage, “The Warsaw Pact and the German Question, 1955–1970,” in Mary Heiss
and Victor Papacosma, eds., NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conflicts (Kent, OH: Kent State
University Press, 2011), pp. 183–184.
21. Under the circumstances, the original venue of East Berlin was not acceptable for Romania.
22. Guidelines for the forthcoming negotiations with the FRG, 17 March 1967, in MNL-OL, KU¨M,
XIX-J-1-j, Box 70. On the Polish position, see Wanda Jarzabek, “Hope and Reality: Poland and
the CSCE: 1964–1989,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 56, Cold War International History Project,
Washington, DC, May 2008.
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its claim to be the sole representative of the German people and accepting the
European borders as settled after World War II.23
Hungarian leaders were shocked that their plans could be so easily derailed
by their allies. When the MSzMP Political Committee met on 13 February
1967, a vehement debate developed concerning the Warsaw diktat and possible
reactions to this humiliating situation.24 Although Hungarian leaders had
been accustomed to complying with actions led by the Soviet Union—even if
they did not agree with them—this was the first time such a major sacrifice
was required not by direct pressure from Moscow but by the pressure of
other Warsaw Pact states.25 This episode marked the gravest alliance-related
crisis for Hungary since 1956. None of the members of the MSzMP Political
Committee regarded the six points of the Warsaw diktat as realistic. Eventually,
they decided that, to maintain the unity of the Warsaw Pact, Hungary would
have to make clear its own position to its allies. Although they did not propose
to renounce the joint resolution accepted in Warsaw, they disagreed with the
main thesis of the protocol because consultation on the matter of establishing
diplomatic relations with the FRG should have been left open. In the end,
however, the situation remained largely unchanged. The Hungarian plan to
normalize relations with Bonn was sacrificed for the common interests of the
Soviet bloc.26
The stance taken by the GDR and Poland may have seemed unduly rigid
and inflexible, but ultimately it was vindicated. The results the East Germans
had been hoping for were achieved in a relatively short period of time. If the
FRG had set up relations with Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia along the
lines advocated by Hungary, this most likely would have significantly altered
the general settlement of the German question. Even the outcome of the
West German elections in September 1969—in which the Social Democratic
Party (SPD) prevailed—could have been called into question. If the FRG had
achieved such an important diplomatic victory by applying a flexible policy
without making basic concessions, this could have been a model for a successful
FRG strategy in the future, with important implications for the entire process
of de´tente.
23. Minutes of the MSzMP Political Committee session, 13 February 1967, in MNL-OL, M-KS.
288, F. 5/417. o˝.e.
24. Ibid.
25. On the Polish and East German positions, see Selvage, “The Warsaw Pact and the German
Question: 1955–1970,” p. 184.
26. In December 1973, Hungary became the last Warsaw Pact member-state to establish diplomatic
relations with the FRG.
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The preconditions set forth in the Warsaw protocol were publicly rein-
forced by the declaration of the Conference of the European Communist and
Workers Parties in April 1967. This seemed to end any hopes the Hungarians
might have had of altering the joint Warsaw Pact position in the near term.
Nonetheless, an unexpected opportunity emerged when far-reaching political
changes began in Czechoslovakia in January 1968. The new leader of the
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSCˇ), Alexander Dubcˇek, came forth
as an ally of Ka´da´r in the task of improving relations with West Germany.
When the two leaders met in Koma´rno on 4 February 1968, they discussed
relations with the FRG at great length. Ka´da´r noted, with great relief, that the
Czechoslovak and Hungarian points of view were identical. He felt sure that
he had found an ally in Dubcˇek on a question of critical importance for the
Hungarian economy.
Ka´da´r and Dubcˇek were pleased that diplomatic relations had been
reestablished between West Germany and Yugoslavia.27 This made three Com-
munist countries (the Soviet Union, Romania, and Yugoslavia) that had official
relations with the FRG. Dubcˇek’s agreement caused Ka´da´r to hope that, with
help from Czechoslovakia, the time might come for the Warsaw diktat to be re-
voked. Ka´da´r used open, flexible language when making this point to Dubcˇek:
We have accepted this agreement and support it without any emotional involve-
ment either way. It came into being under adverse circumstances. The position
it creates is a rigid one, and the six points [of the Warsaw protocol] give the
impression that we expected the FRG to proclaim itself a Soviet republic. The
conditions are over-the-top and too rigid. I said that we were of course going to
support the agreement, but afterward we informed all the parties concerned that
this question was not going to go away. It continues to be on the agenda. The
situation must be reviewed constantly—and the same applies to what needs to
be done about it. It’s not one of those problems that can be dealt with once and
for all. And we cannot afford not to be able to come up with political answers to
political questions.
Dubcˇek and a senior KSCˇ official responsible for international affairs,
Vladimı´r Koucky´, were in full agreement with Ka´da´r.28 That Ka´da´r pinned his
hopes of bringing about a review of the Warsaw Pact’s attitude toward the FRG
on Dubcˇek’s mediation helps to explain why the Hungarian leader insisted
27. Yugoslavia was one of the two “victims” of the Hallstein Doctrine. After Belgrade recognized the
GDR in 1957, the FRG broke off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. (The same happened to Cuba
in 1963.)




for so long that Czechoslovakia’s consolidation in the Soviet bloc be carried
out under Dubcˇek rather than under the hardline “healthy forces” backed by
Moscow.29
The German Question and the Issue of European
Security and Cooperation
Following the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, all hopes
Ka´da´r once had of finding allies to push for a more flexible Warsaw Pact
position on the German question vanished. Hungarian officials had little
choice but to reevaluate their strategy and tactics on the German issue. They
had not totally abandoned hope that the situation might improve through
mutual concessions from both the FRG and the Soviet bloc. But by the
summer of 1969 they sensed that diplomatic relations with the FRG could
not be established until after the Warsaw preconditions had been fulfilled.
Thus, Hungary hoped that substantial progress in the settlement of the
German question would enhance its chances of normalizing relations with the
FRG. Up to this point, Hungary’s position on the matter had been swayed
by external pressure from the security-concerned sub-bloc within the Warsaw
Pact. But Hungary’s effort to settle the German problem and achieve the
desired normalization increasingly came under its own control.
At this juncture, another opportunity emerged for Hungary, thanks to
the unexpected acceleration of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) in which Ka´da´r played an important role. The Budapest
Declaration of the Warsaw Pact, issued at the PCC session on 17 March
1969, became a milestone in the history of East-West relations. This initiative
commenced the process that led to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in
August 1975. This was both a novelty and a success because—contrary to the
Bucharest declaration of 1966—it called on the European countries to hold a
security conference without setting any preconditions.
We now know that the Budapest Declaration was not the result of well-
organized and synchronized preparation as depicted in the mass media at the
time. In truth, it was a document published by the Warsaw Pact member-states
at the end of a surprisingly brief political coordination process, comprising
29. On Hungary’s role during the Prague Spring, see Csaba Be´ke´s, “Hungary and the Prague Spring,”
in Gu¨nter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler, eds., The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact
Invasion of Czechoslovakia: 1968 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), pp. 371–395.
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numerous elements that were improvised after fierce debate among the
participants.30
The visible and rather spectacular outcome of the Budapest meeting, en-
acting the first major reform in the military structure of the Warsaw Pact and
issuing a promising appeal for a conference on European security, was based
on a de facto Soviet-Hungarian-Romanian coalition.31 The main achievement
of the meeting was that the Soviet- and Hungarian-sponsored proposal, stip-
ulating that no precondition should be set for the convening of a European
security conference, was eventually accepted by all parties despite initial op-
position from Polish and East German leaders. The inclusion of this unified
stance of the Warsaw Pact states became a crucial factor in the initiation of the
CSCE process.32
Despite having played a critical role in mediating this historical compro-
mise, Hungarian leaders initially failed to recognize the significance of the
Budapest Declaration in shaping world politics. They did not understand
the full potential of the initiative until well after the session, particularly at
the end of March when the Soviet Union launched a new campaign in sup-
port of the security conference. At this juncture the Hungarians realized that
the declaration—in a favorable environment—could become the basis for
launching a process that would lead to the staging of CSCE.
Consequently, in July 1969, Hungarian leaders adopted a resolution re-
garding Hungary’s relations with the FRG, which stipulated that the road
toward normalization would determine the general settlement of the German
question.33 At the same time, encouraged by the success of the Budapest Dec-
laration, Hungarian foreign policymakers began to focus on promoting the
start of CSCE. Ka´da´r discerned a connection between the CSCE project and
the German issue and hoped that progress on the security conference would
enhance Hungary’s chances of normalizing relations with the FRG.
30. For a detailed account of the secret talks preceding the Warsaw Pact PCC session, see Be´ke´s, “The
Warsaw Pact and the Helsinki Process,” pp. 201–220.
31. Malcolm Byrne and Vojtech Mastny, eds., A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact:
1955–1991 (Budapest: CEU Press, 2005), pp. 323–329. On the position of the Romanian delegation
at the Budapest meeting, see “Stenographic Transcript of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of
the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, 18 March 1969,” in A Cardboard Castle?,
ed. Byrne and Mastny, pp. 332–338.
32. The paragraph on the German question included all the preconditions set forth in the Bucharest
Declaration of July 1966. However, these demands were now presented in the appeal as eventual
political goals and not as preconditions to the staging of a conference on European security.




After the PCC meeting in Budapest, the Soviet Union conducted an
intensive campaign from the end of March to propagate the need for CSCE.34
Although the CSCE Final Act was not signed until 1975, declassified records
indicate that the foundations of the process were laid during the one-and-a-half
year period between the two Budapest sessions of the PCC.
The issue of the security conference occupied an exceptional position
because of prolonged preparatory work on the matter undertaken during
the Communist and Workers Parties conference held a few months later in
Moscow in June 1969, as well as the security conference’s featured position
in the final document of the conference. But what really allowed CSCE to
begin were important changes in Western policy. After assuming the U.S.
presidency in January 1969, Richard Nixon established a back-channel with
Moscow via Henry Kissinger. At a session of the North Atlantic Council in
April 1969, Nixon spoke positively about new opportunities for an East-West
rapprochement.35 An equally important development followed when the SPD,
together with the Free Democratic Party (FDP), formed a government after
the September 1969 FRG elections and announced a new Ostpolitik. Thus, the
two key Western countries—the United States and West Germany—shifted
considerably from their earlier positions, thereby enhancing the chances of the
Warsaw Pact’s initiatives.36
In the intensive Soviet-bloc campaign in 1969 to promote a pan-European
security conference, the Hungarians became one of the staunchest backers
of Soviet diplomacy. Hungary’s interests basically aligned with those of the
Soviet Union in fostering an East-West rapprochement. Hungarian leaders
had no interest in establishing preconditions for a European settlement (unlike
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR) and thus could benefit only if the
process succeeded. They had forged contacts with Western Europe and attained
a certain level of prestige as promoters of de´tente. The Hungarians were
innovative and ready to take the initiative, but they were also good partners
who loyally, flexibly, and reliably accommodated Soviet tactical requirements.
The East Germans and Poles, not to mention the Romanians, were much
34. Soviet information about the Soviet foreign ministry’s activities regarding the European security
conference, 1 April 1969, in MNL-OL, KU¨M, XIX. J-1-j-VSZ-VI-1–001547/3/1969, Box 106.
35. On U.S. policy, see David C. Geyer and Douglas E. Selvage, eds., Soviet-American Relations: The
De´tente Years: 1969–1972 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007).
36. On the Helsinki process, see three excellent, recently published edited volumes: Bange and
Niedhart, eds., Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe; Loth and Soutou, eds., The Making
of De´tente; and Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny, and Christian Nuenlist eds., Origins of the European
Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75 (London: Routledge, 2008).
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less manageable, often adhering to their own rigid ideas about an appropriate
agenda for CSCE.
At the end of September 1969, Soviet leaders indicated that the Warsaw
Pact foreign ministers would hold a conference the next month. The main
task would be to arrive at a common position on CSCE. In preliminarily
testing the opinions of the individual states, several Soviet deputy foreign
ministers made simultaneous visits to the member-states. On 26 September,
Leonid Ilichev held talks with Hungarian Foreign Minister Pe´ter in Budapest.
Ilichev proposed that the two main items on the CSCE agenda should be the
renunciation of the use of force and a declaration urging the development of
economic, trade, and technological-scientific cooperation among the European
states.37 The MSzMP Political Committee met on 7 October and directed
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to elaborate the Hungarian position. The
proposal, which was ready by mid-October, contained a remarkable number of
independent suggestions that, according to the ministry, served the purpose of
“presenting the. . . ideas of the European socialist countries in a more attractive
and meaningful way,” making the persuasion of uncertain states easier.38 The
document suggested the following:
As an addition to the first item on the agenda, there should be a debate on the
European security system and its institutions addressing the following topics:
• the signing of bilateral and regional agreements (e.g. between the coun-
tries of the Danube Valley);
• the preparation of an agreement on European security suggested by the
Poles;
• the establishment of a series of conferences on European security, the
creation of a European Security Council responsible for European secu-
rity issues, and the linkage of the European Economic Council to the
European Security Council.
With regard to the second item on the agenda, the proposal additionally
suggested:
• the elaboration of a system of European economic cooperation (which
would involve the linking of European systems of electricity, natural gas,
oil, postal service, and telecommunications, the harmonized improve-
ment of European transportation networks, the promotion of industrial
37. Notes on the discussion with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister L. F. Iljichev, 27 September 1969,
in MNL-OL, KU¨M, XIX. J-1-j-Szu-1–00358–20/1969, Box 85.
38. Foreign Ministry memorandum on the European Security conference for the MSzMP Political
Committee, 13 October 1969, in MNL-OL, M-KS. 288, F. 5/501. o˝.e.
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cooperation, the harmonization of standards, and the abolition of trade
barriers and encouragement of tourism);
• the setting up of a Committee for European Economic Cooperation
or steps to ensure that the UN European Economic Commission func-
tioned in accordance with the guiding principles of the conference on
European security;
• the convocation in Budapest of a conference of mayors of European
capitals to debate issues of better cooperation between the capitals and
of common municipal problems.
Finally, for the purpose of consolidating foreign policy coordination, the pro-
posal suggested that, after the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers gathered in
Prague, a meeting of Soviet-bloc Central Committee Secretaries should be
organized to discuss CSCE.
The Hungarian document was ambitious and rather bold in its ideas about
European cooperation. Numerous points addressed methods of cooperation
that did not become feasible until after the end of the Cold War in 1989–1990
or until Hungary’s accession to the European Union in 2004. The Hungarian
draft constituted a medium- and long-term “package” rather than a limited
program to satisfy the tactical requirements of the initial phase.
Although the Polish, Romanian, and East German proposals were all
aimed at strengthening European security, the Hungarian proposals dealt
mainly with European cooperation. Thus, Hungarian diplomacy—only in
formal accord with Soviet intentions—essentially followed the Western strat-
egy of emphasizing cooperation. Perhaps the most important “relation” in
which these ambitious plans would have been implemented—albeit one not
specified in the proposals—was the Hungarian-FRG relationship, based on
the dominant status of the FRG among Hungary’s Western economic partners
at that time.
After holding preliminary bilateral consultations, Soviet leaders realized
that establishing a unified position at the upcoming meeting of foreign
ministers—even without the expected attitude of the Romanians—would not
be so easily achieved. Thus, on 17 October, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Vladimir Semenov requested an urgent personal conferral with the Hungari-
ans. The following day, Hungarian Deputy Minister Ka´roly Erde´lyi met with
Semenov in Moscow.39 The Soviet Union worried that because of divergent
39. Notes by Deputy Foreign Minister Ka´roly Erde´lyi for the MSzMP PC, 18 October 1969, in
MNL-OL M-KS-288, F. 5/501. o˝ e. The document is published in Csaba Be´ke´s and Anna Locher,
eds., Hungary and the Warsaw Pact: 1954–1989: Documents on the Impact of a Small State within the
Eastern Bloc (Zurich: Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, 2003).
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Polish, Romanian, and East German suggestions, the Warsaw Pact could not
reach consensus and would lose control of the security conference initiative in
spite of the favorable international circumstances. Therefore, in the framework
of the “special relationship” evolving at this time, Soviet leaders asked their
Hungarian counterparts to act in restraining the excessive Polish, East German,
and Romanian proposals that would be voiced at the forthcoming meeting of
Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Prague. Set for 30–31 October 1969, the
meeting was convened to reconsider Soviet-bloc policy in light of the SPD vic-
tory in West Germany the previous month.40 The Polish proposals sought to
recognize the territorial status quo and the existing European borders, as well
as attain de jure recognition of the GDR. The Romanians wanted to include
in the joint documents an appeal for the dissolution of the military blocs, the
withdrawal of foreign troops from Europe, the elimination of foreign military
bases, and the renunciation of the use of force. The East German proposals
called for recognition of the GDR by the security conference.
Soviet officials indicated that to facilitate the talks the Hungarians should
refrain from presenting their own proposals and wait until later to submit them.
According to Moscow, the key to success was gradualism. The negotiations
would have to focus on issues of economic cooperation and security, which
had been favorably received by the West.
As a result of the Soviet request for Hungarian mediation on 21 October,
the MSzMP Political Committee simultaneously discussed the foreign minis-
terial proposal and the outcome of Erde´lyi’s recent consultations in Moscow.41
Ka´da´r was dissatisfied with the recommended procedure and insisted that,
instead of formulating a final position at the foreign ministerial meeting, the
delegations should take the proposals raised there and present them back
home for debate and endorsement. Finally, after some discussion, the Hungar-
ian leaders—as so often before—decided to accept the situation and authorize
Pe´ter to assume a “constructive” position at the upcoming meeting in accor-
dance with Moscow’s “friendly request.” As a result, the Hungarian delegation
played an important mediating role at the session of foreign ministers in Prague
on 30–31 October 1969.
At the meeting, a vigorous debate erupted once again. When the deputy
foreign ministers had met earlier to discuss various options pertaining to
40. Memorandum of conversation between Hungarian deputy foreign minister Ka´roly Erde´lyi and
Soviet deputy foreign minister Semjonov on 17 October 1969 in Moscow, 18 October 1969, in
MNL-OL, M-KS. 288, F. 5/501 o˝.e.




the security conference, the Polish, Romanian, and East German delegates
had staunchly defended their own interests.42 However, the Soviet-Hungarian
gambit finally triumphed. By the end of the meeting, the parties had forged
a consensus along the lines of the Soviet-Hungarian position.43 Two docu-
ments were endorsed at the session: an open declaration and a memorandum
presented to Western governments. The latter document also contained the
draft of the final document of the planned security conference, which revealed
considerable optimism. The leaders of the Soviet bloc were similarly optimistic
about the possible timing of the conference. Thereafter, at nearly all meetings,
they urged that the conference be initiated within a year.
In return for cooperating in Prague, Hungarian officials were able to put
forth several important proposals at this early stage that later became crucial
elements of the joint Warsaw Pact policy concerning the CSCE process. Thus,
the foreign ministers at their meeting in Prague agreed that a series of security
conferences should take place and that a permanent organ should be set up to
coordinate the preparation work.44 They also agreed that a group of experts
dealing with European economic cooperation should be established within
the Warsaw Pact and that its work should be coordinated by the Hungarian
Foreign Ministry. This outcome underscored Hungarian leaders’ desire to take
the lead in promoting East-West economic relations. The assignment also
showed the country’s growing international status.
The main result of the foreign ministers’ meeting was the Warsaw Pact
states’ proposal of two basic topics for discussion at the security conference: (1)
European security and the renunciation of violence in relations among states;
and (2) the widening of trade, economic, and technological relations based on
equality, serving political cooperation among the European states.45
By the end of 1969, the formation of the Brandt government in Bonn pro-
Q1
Q2
duced a breakthrough on the question of European security. The far-reaching
change in the West German position produced a distinct qualitative change,
foreshadowing the possibility of the settlement of the German question, which
42. On Poland, see Jarzabek, “Hope and Reality.”
43. Report to the Revolutionary Workers-Peasants Government on the meeting on 30–31 October
1969 in Prague by the representatives of the foreign ministries of the seven socialist countries, in
MNL-OL, KU¨M, XIX-J-1-j-VSZ-VI-003272/1969, Box 105.
44. The proposal to hold a series of conferences originally came from the Soviet side. It was raised
during Semenov’s talks with Pe´ter in Budapest on 24 September 1969. The idea became a “Hungarian”
initiative in the framework of the Soviet-Hungarian diplomatic game preceding the Warsaw Pact foreign
ministers’ meeting in Prague.
45. Foreign Ministry memorandum for the MSzMP Political Committee on the European security
conference, in MNL-OL, M-KS-288, F. 5/501. o˝.e.
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was of paramount importance for European security, at least from the point
of view of the East Europeans. Soviet-FRG negotiations commenced on 8
December. Before long, they resulted in an agreement to hold consultations
between the FRG and Poland over the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border.46
Led by a rather confused Ulbricht, a summit meeting of Warsaw Pact party
leaders was held in Moscow on 3–4 December with the goal of coordinating
policy vis-a`-vis the FRG.47 The GDR leaders wanted to circumvent the signing
of an agreement with the FRG behind their backs. Although they vehemently
opposed the planned Polish–West German negotiations, a de facto Polish-
Hungarian-Romanian “axis” emerged during the meeting seeking to push
matters ahead, with support from Moscow. Thus, a majority of participants
in the Moscow summit believed that the significant changes in FRG policy
offered hope for settlement of the German question in concordance with the
interests of the Soviet bloc. The summit resulted in a compromise: no drastic
changes were allowed in the Warsaw Pact states’ relations with West Germany,
but they could initiate negotiations on bilateral ties with Bonn. Nonetheless,
diplomatic relations could not be established until the FRG recognized the
GDR in the framework of international law.
Thus, the channel for direct negotiation with the FRG was reopened after
the world Communist summit in Moscow in December 1969. This was, in
some sense, a move away from the Warsaw principle of February 1967, which
had stated that the conditions for entering into diplomatic relations with the
FRG were not yet ripe for East European countries that did not yet have such
relations with West Germany.
Hungary and the GDR
For Hungary, for reasons extending beyond mere bloc discipline, the Ger-
man question meant dealing with two Germanys. Hungarian-GDR bilateral
relations were never especially close. In the 1960s and 1970s, apart from the
Soviet Union, the GDR was the most ardent critic of Hungarian economic
and domestic policy. Moreover, on some occasions GDR personnel “spied” on
Hungarian internal developments and cultural life.48
46. The Soviet-FRG treaty on sanctifying the Oder-Neisse border was signed on 12 August 1970, and
a similar Polish-FRG treaty was signed on 7 December 1970.
47. Report to the MSzMP Central Committee and the Hungarian government on the session of
the party and state leaders of the European socialist countries in Moscow on 3–4 December 1969, 8
December 1969, in MNL-OL, M-KS-288, F. 5/507, o˝.e.
48. Notes by Gyo¨rgy Acze´l and Zolta´n Komo´csin on the activities in Hungary of an “alleged GDR”
publisher, 4 February 1969, in MNL-OL, M-KS. 288, F. 5/483. o˝.e.
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Serious personal conflicts occasionally erupted between the leaders of
the two countries. In mid-July 1968, during the Warsaw meeting of the
five Soviet-bloc states preparing for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Ulbricht
lost his composure, as he was wont to do. He not only denounced Ka´da´r’s
tolerant evaluation of the situation but added that the “fraternal parties” might
next have to turn their attention to resolving Hungary’s internal problems.49
This implied the emergence of a dangerous tendency that entitled “fraternal
parties” to act as joint troubleshooters not only in crises but also in the context
of peaceful reforms. Despite posing no danger to socialism, these reforms were
considered undesirable by some of the East-bloc partners—particularly the
GDR. After Czechoslovakia, Hungary was the next candidate for externally
imposed discipline at that time.50
Hence, when Hungarian leaders were speaking privately among them-
selves, they depicted the East Germans as wholly orthodox in politics and
ideology and regularly criticized them. They also regarded cynical East Ger-
man tactics with great skepticism. Whereas Ulbricht acted as the Eastern
bloc’s chief proponent of true Marxism-Leninism, he also did everything in
his power to extort as much extra profit as possible from GDR-FRG economic
relations. The GDR even concealed from the other countries the true nature,
magnitude, and details of the highly lucrative “intra-German business.”
In public, however, Hungarian leaders vigorously supported the diplo-
matic struggle to secure international recognition for the GDR in the 1960s
and early 1970s and avoided criticizing the East German regime. This moral
support stemmed in part from solidarity based on historical experience. From
the time of the revolution and Soviet invasion in late 1956 until early 1963,
Hungary had fought a similar battle to escape from international isolation.
A more important motivation for Hungary’s loyalty stemmed from its
economic interests. Within the Eastern bloc, Hungary’s most balanced eco-
nomic relationship was with the GDR—a relationship that proved valuable
49. Jaromı´r Navra´til et al., eds., The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), pp. 218, 220–221. Ka´da´r’s speech is reprinted in
Stefan Karner, Natalja Tomilina, and Alexander Tschubarjan, eds., Prager Fru¨hling: Das internationale
Krisenjahr 1968: Dokumente (Cologne: Bo¨hlau Verlag, 2008), pp. 514–563.
50. This threat could in no way be dismissed as lacking credibility. A sobering precedent had been
established not so long ago. Following the failure of the Hungarian revolution in 1956, the Soviet,
Czechoslovak, Bulgarian, and Romanian leaders at the Communist summit on 1–4 January 1957 in
Budapest forced the Hungarian party to make serious concessions concerning the political development
of the country. This included vetoing the introduction of a limited pseudo-multiparty system, akin to
the Czechoslovak model. The same forum also decided on the initiation of a court procedure against
the members of the Imre Nagy group. Csaba Be´ke´s, Malcolm Byrne, and Ja´nos M. Rainer, eds., The
1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents (Budapest: CEU Press, 2002), pp. 485–495.
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for obtaining (relatively) advanced technology at a time when export restric-
tions limited what could be brought in from the West. Moreover, the GDR
was a reliable economic partner for Hungary, with the most developed indus-
try among the Warsaw Pact states. East Germany gradually became a prime
supplier of consumer goods that were essential for the well-being of Hungar-
ian society, thus contributing in a substantial way to Ka´da´r’s main goal, the
maintenance of a socialist consumer-oriented system. Consequently, the com-
mercial turnover between the two states increased fourfold in the 1970s, and by
the 1980s the GDR had become Hungary’s third-most-important economic
partner, surpassed only by the FRG and the Soviet Union.51
It is an irony of history that after decades of sustained moral support
and favorable bilateral relations, a singular Hungarian diplomatic action in
September 1989—namely, the opening of the Hungarian-Austrian border to
East German refugees—facilitated the collapse of the East German Commu-
nist regime, ultimately leading to German unity and thus the extinction of the
GDR.52
The Process of Normalization with the FRG,
1969–1975
Beginning in 1969, Hungarian officials devised a new approach to ties with
West Germany that might be called “quasi-normalization.” While patiently
waiting for a general settlement of the German question—and consequently
accepting the notion that Hungary might be the last Soviet-bloc country to
establish diplomatic relations with the FRG—Hungarian politicians fostered
dynamic improvements of Hungarian–West German economic relations at all
possible levels.
In July 1969, the MSzMP Political Committee adopted a resolution
that served as the basis of all future actions until early 1973.53 After the
Communist summit in Moscow in December 1969, the Hungarian Foreign
51. Be´la Ka´da´r, “Magyarorsza´g gazdasa´gi kapcsolatai az NDK-val e´s az NSZK-val,” Ku¨lpolitika, Vol.
13, No. 1 (1986), pp. 20–21.
52. On the international context of the political transition in Hungary, see Csaba Be´ke´s, “Back to
Europe: The International Context of the Political Transition in Hungary, 1988–1990,” in Andra´s
Bozo´ki, ed., The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy (Budapest: CEU Press,
2002), pp. 237–272. For an archive-based history of the opening of the border, see Andra´s Oplatka,
Egy do¨nte´s to¨rte´nete: Magyar hata´rnyita´s 1989 — Szeptember 11 — Nulla o´ra (Budapest: Helikon Kiado´,
2008).
53. Minutes of the MSzMP Political Committee, 1 July 1969.
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Ministry elaborated new guidelines for Hungarian-FRG relations, emphasizing
the need to handle the issue in a flexible, tactical manner.54
This policy was aimed at killing two birds with one stone. First, the
policy’s highly “internationalist,” loyal stance was intended to please Soviet
leaders, whose goodwill and tolerance were very much needed for Hungary
during the struggle to defend the economic reforms introduced in January
1968. Second, the policy was intended to be a solid overture to the FRG,
which was eager to improve trade and cooperation with Hungary. From 1969
to 1973, economic relations improved in an unprecedented way. In 1970,
commerce grew by 43 percent in just one year. Overall, trade between the two
states tripled during this period.55 The FRG remained, as it long had, in the
top place among Hungary’s most important capitalist partners. Tourism also
became an important source of hard currency for Hungary, and one-third of
Western tourists arrived from the FRG.
The most important actions were the mutual visits of economic ministers
and the signing of a five-year economic and technological agreement between
the two states in 1970. These steps also facilitated the further development of
“cooperation agreements” between Hungarian and West German firms. These
agreements were an important means for Hungary to acquire high technology
from the FRG. At that time, 65 percent of all such Hungarian contracts
were made with West German firms. In the FRG itself, the majority of such
contracts existed with Hungary.56 Consequently, during these years both sides
felt that bilateral economic relations were in extremely good shape, with or
without full diplomatic relations.57
Long-standing problems in bilateral economic ties were partly resolved at
that time by the FRG’s agreement to pay 100 million DM as compensation for
the confiscation of assets as well as 17 million DM as compensation for forced
medical treatment in Nazi concentration camps. Hungary had yet another
claim against the FRG valued at more than 1 billion DM. However, officials
in Budapest were under no illusions about the prospects for such restitution.
Hungary, under Soviet pressure, had renounced all of these claims in the Paris
54. Foreign Ministry guidelines concerning the political and diplomatic tasks deriving from the
political changes in West Germany and from the conference of the Warsaw Treaty member-states in
Moscow, 20 January 1970, in MNL-OL, KU¨M. XIX-J-1-j, Box 103.
55. Foreign Ministry memorandum on the Soviet bloc states with the FRG, 1971, in MNL-OL,
KU¨M, XIX. J-1-j, Box 78. For a survey of Hungarian-FRG relations, see Kiss, “Az elso˝ a´llamko¨zi
mega´llapoda´sto´l a diploma´ciai kapcsolatok felve´tele´ig.”
56. Foreign Ministry memorandum on the relations of the FRG with the socialist countries, 1971, in
MNL-OL, KU¨M. XIX-J-1-j, Box 78.
57. Foreign Ministry proposal on Hungarian-FRG political talks, 31 March 1972, in MNL-OL,
KU¨M, XIX. J-1-j, Box 78.
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Peace Treaty of 1947. The item was kept on the agenda more as a bargaining
chip than as a real demand.58
This ex lex situation was, in reality, highly favorable for Hungary. Despite
achieving major progress in economic ties, Hungarian leaders were not com-
pelled to apply reciprocity to the field of cultural relations. That is, even as
Hungary was conducting an intensive cultural propaganda campaign within
the FRG—often financed by West German institutions—the Hungarian gov-
ernment could easily and legally limit West German cultural activity by citing
the lack of a cultural agreement between the two states. At the same time, Hun-
garian officials pursued a flexible policy toward the activity of the West German
trade mission that started to behave as a quasi-legation during these years.59
A wide array of official exchanges occurred at all levels during this period,
including visits from high-ranking government officials, trade union leaders,
and SPD politicians. A special back-channel even evolved between the MSzMP
and SPD through the services of Hans Ju¨rgen Wischnewski of the SPD, who
visited Hungary several times, mostly in secret.60
Thus, the Brandt government tacitly accepted the cautious but pragmatic
position of the Hungarians. The FRG did not force the issue of establishing
diplomatic relations before a general settlement of the German question. The
West Germans’ tolerant attitude may have been influenced by a successful
intelligence operation as well. Having acquired a copy of the top secret MSzMP
Political Committee resolution of 1 July 1969 on Hungarian-FRG relations,
the West German government had a clear view of the Hungarians’ strategy
and tactics as well as of Hungarian leaders’ limited room for maneuver in the
Soviet bloc.61
Nevertheless, in August 1972 Brandt requested that Ka´da´r meet with him
confidentially in Bonn to discuss the establishment of diplomatic relations.62
Brandt also suggested that, as an alternative option, Wischnewski could travel
58. Foreign Ministry proposal for the forthcoming Hungarian–West German talks, 31 March 1972,
in MNL-OL, KU¨M. XIX-J-1-j, Box 78.
59. Report by Lothar Lahn of the West German Foreign Ministry on his conversation with Barta,
head of the department for Western Europe in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 15 October 1970, in
Akten zur Auswa¨rtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: 1970 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001), pp.
1779–1781 (henceforth cited as AAPD with appropriate year and page nos.)
60. Wischnewski’s visits were mentioned at the following meetings of the MSzMP Political Committee:
9 February 1971, 19 September 1972, 30 January 1973, 4 December 1973, 28 January 1975, and 11
November 1980.
61. Hardo Bru¨ckner, head of the West German trade mission in Budapest, to Bonn, 22 and 24
October 1969, in AAPD 1969, pp. 1151–1153, 1155–1157. This document analyzes the MSzMP
resolution in detail.
62. MSzMP CC Department of Foreign Affairs proposal to the Political Committee, 30 August 1972,
in MNL-OL, M-KS. 288 f. 5/590. o˝.e.
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to Budapest for talks about this issue. The MSzMP Political Committee met
on 5 September 1972 and decided to receive Wischnewski and inform Soviet
and East German leaders about the talks.63 This happened prior to the general
elections in the FRG in the fall of that year, when a diplomatic success might
have raised the chances for an SPD victory.
Wischnewski, along with Eugen Selbmann, met with Zolta´n Komo´csin,
the MSzMP Secretary responsible for international affairs, on 15 September
1972. The West Germans argued that everyone interested in the success of
the de´tente process needed to support the SPD’s bid to stay in power. The
normalization of relations with Poland had provided great support to this end,
and Hungary was now supposed to contribute as well by urging its partners to
reconsider the issue of establishing diplomatic relations with the FRG before
the forthcoming elections. Komo´csin demurred, stating that Hungary had to
be loyal to its allies and therefore could not establish diplomatic relations with
Bonn before the normalization of West Germany’s relations with the GDR
and Czechoslovakia. Although support of the Brandt government was a general
line of the Soviet bloc by that time, the Hungarians turned down the West
German initiative.64
Consequently, a new phase of negotiations was opened only in January
1973. After the German question had been basically settled (except with respect
to Czechoslovakia), the MSzMP Political Committee adopted a new resolution
regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG.65 The res-
olution proposed for this to happen in the first half of the year, but because of
the prolongation of the FRG-Czechoslovak talks the move was postponed un-
til the summer. After the conclusion of the Czechoslovak-FRG negotiations,
Hungarian leaders expected normalization to occur in early September. By
then, however, Bonn had created new problems concerning judicial assistance
for West Berlin’s citizens. The issue was resolved through Soviet mediation,
and diplomatic relations were finally established on 21 December 1973. Prior
to that, one more condition was agreed upon: Brandt confidentially requested
63. Minutes of the MSzMP Political Committee, 5 September 1972, in MNL-OL, M-KS. 288, F.
5/590. o˝.e.
64. Report on Zolta´n Komo´csin’s talks with SPD politicians H. J. Wischnewski and H. [sic] Selbmann,
15 September 1972, in MNL-OL, M-KS. 288, F. 11. cs. 3433. o˝.e. For a recently published history
on the MSzMP’s relations with Social Democratic parties in Western Europe (especially the SPD), see
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2012).
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the release of Ma´ria Kere´nyi, an employee of the Hungarian Institute for
International Cultural Relations, jailed for alleged spying for the FRG.66
Thus, whereas Hungary in 1967 had been among the first to respond to
the prospect of reestablishing diplomatic ties with West Germany, it was the
last member of the Soviet bloc actually to do so. Yet, during the years when
the German question was being settled, from 1967 to 1973, Hungary enjoyed
a lucrative, largely unproblematic, and even amicable relationship with West
Germany.
Following normalization, the task of developing political and cultural
relations remained. Economic relations were already conducted in a highly
satisfactory manner. After the opening of embassies, an agreement was made
concerning the establishment of a consulate general in West Berlin. In turn,
the FRG was authorized to represent the citizens of West Berlin in Hungary.
Political connections intensified, and in April 1974 Walter Scheel became the
first West German foreign minister to visit Budapest. Both Helmut Schmidt
and Ka´da´r had been invited to each other’s countries in early 1974, but the
first summit was not held until 1975 at the signing of the Helsinki Final
Act. Although the first visit by Ka´da´r to the FRG was planned for 1976, it
eventually took place in July 1977.
Hungary, the German Question, and the CSCE
Process, 1970–1975
One major achievement of the Prague conference of Warsaw Pact foreign
ministers in October 1969 was the subsequent launching of a series of intensive
bilateral East-West dialogues, with active participation from the East-Central
European countries. Until June 1970, Hungary held consultations with the
foreign ministers of Belgium, Sweden, Netherlands, Norway, and Italy, as well
as with deputy foreign ministers and heads of departments in the British,
French, West German, Austrian, and Turkish foreign ministries regarding the
proposed security conference.67
The CSCE process entered its most intensive phase at this time, becom-
ing a milestone not only in Hungary’s relations with the West but also in
66. Minutes of the MSzMP Political Committee, 18 December 1973, in MNL-OL, M-KS. 288, F.
5/626. o˝.e.
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Hungarian-Soviet relations. By 1969, a special Soviet-Hungarian partnership
mechanism had evolved. Hungary proved to be an ideal partner for Moscow
in this complex process—a process in which convincing allies was often more
difficult than persuading the other side.
Subsequently, a far-reaching shift occurred in Hungarian foreign policy-
making. The old model remained formally unchanged. Notably, every impor-
tant issue at the decision-making level remained in the hands of the MSzMP
Political Committee. However, major changes were introduced in preliminary
decision-making, initiation, proposals, implementation, and auxiliary diplo-
matic work. The role of the Foreign Ministry apparatus increased significantly,
and the intensity of multifaceted and multidirectional negotiations assumed
an important role alongside the Political Committee. Presumably, this became
the starting point for the emancipation of Hungarian foreign policy activity.
Although this process had commenced as early as 1963, the fundamental shift
toward the active and intensive role of Hungarian diplomats occurred during
the CSCE process.
From this time on, the European security conference became a high
priority for Hungarian leaders, who had been intensely pursuing economic
opportunities vis-a`-vis the West since the mid-1960s. Aside from Romania
and perhaps Poland, Hungary was likely to gain the greatest benefits from
the process in light of the positive effects it was expected to have on the
evolution of East-West relations. Hungarian leaders assumed correctly that
these objectives had to be pursued within the framework of a divided War-
saw Pact. Hence, they deduced that for the sake of success, more effective
and more systematic coordination of foreign policy was necessary within the
Soviet bloc. In this respect, the establishment of the Pact’s Council of For-
eign Ministers (CFM)—proposed by Hungarian leaders on several occasions
from 1958 on—might have served as a suitable platform.68 The Hungarians
knew that Romania opposed the establishment of the CFM, but they hoped
that “Leninist gradualism” would prevail in this respect, too, so that even
if an official body (the CFM) were not created, perhaps a regular platform
of foreign ministers could surface. During a visit to Moscow in December
1969, Foreign Minister Pe´ter proposed this idea to Gromyko. Soviet leaders
quickly approved it and authorized the Hungarians to start preparations for the
68. See Csaba Be´ke´s, “Titkos va´lsa´gkezele´sto˝l a politikai koordina´cio´ig: Politikai egyeztete´si mech-
anizmus a Varso´i Szerzo˝de´sben: 1954–1967,” in Ja´nos M. Rainer, ed., Mu´lt sza´zadi he´tko¨znapok:
Tanulma´nyok a Ka´da´r rendszer kialakula´sa´nak ido˝szaka´ro´l (Budapest: 1956-os Inte´zet, 2003), pp. 9–54.
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necessary bilateral consultative negotiations.69 In January 1970, Deputy For-
eign Minister Frigyes Puja paid a visit to Bucharest to discuss the plan, but the
mission failed. The Romanians did not accept the creation of the CFM until
1974, under changed conditions. The body was finally established in 1976.70
In early 1970, auspicious developments in international politics bolstered
the chances of staging a security conference. In a speech to the U.S. Congress
on 18 February, Nixon declared that the United States recognized the So-
viet Union’s legitimate security interests in Eastern Europe and stressed his
willingness to negotiate in the interest of reducing international tension and
promoting rapprochement. The resolution adopted by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) at its meeting in Rome on 26–27 May 1970
contained numerous new elements. Most notably, it mentioned the security
conference in concrete terms and proposed to stage multilateral negotiations
under certain conditions. The NATO declaration did not link the issue of
troop reductions in Europe with CSCE.
Following these developments, the real turning point concerning the
plans for a European security conference came at the June 1970 meeting of the
Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Budapest, convened at Hungary’s initiative.
This event marked the end of exploratory negotiations and the beginning of
the period involving direct East-West dialogue over the staging of a European
security conference. A dynamic debate ensued among the participants at the
meeting, as well as at the preceding deputy foreign ministers’ session, and the
Hungarian hosts played at least as intensive a mediating role as they did during
the formulation of the Budapest Appeal.71
The conference became the second major turning point in the CSCE
process within the Warsaw Pact (the first being the Budapest Appeal), primarily
because the Pact now adopted two conditions demanded by the Western
side to allow preparatory negotiations to proceed. First, the Pact’s declaration
recognized the right of the United States and Canada to participate in the
conference as full members. Second, apart from the two points on the agenda
proposed by the Warsaw Pact, the declaration acknowledge that a third point
69. Report to the MSzMP CC and the government on the foreign minister’s official visit to the Soviet
Union, 22–29 December 1969, 6 January 1970, in MNL-OL, KU¨M, XIX. J-1-j-SU-00949–1/1970,
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should be included: the issue of cultural relations and the investigation of
the human environment. Although the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact
member-states had been well aware that staging the conference would be
impossible without the United States and Canada, they raised this matter for
tactical reasons until they managed to secure the participation of the GDR
in exchange. The topic of cultural relations was adopted via a Hungarian
initiative, which meant no less than the tacit incorporation of the “third
basket” (as it was named in a later phase of the preliminary dialogue) in the
structure of the multilateral talks. The question of the third basket played a key
role at a later stage insofar as it contained the components that mirrored basic
Western interests during the great European settlement. This factor served as
a foundation for the evolution of the human rights campaign of the post-
Helsinki period, which eventually played a limited role in the disintegration
of the East-Central European Communist systems at the end of the 1980s.
A decision was also reached at the foreign ministers’ meeting in Budapest
regarding the establishment of a permanent body that would assume respon-
sibility for issues related to European security and cooperation, particularly to
assess options for the reduction of the armed forces. The Soviet Union agreed
to hold talks on reductions of European armed forces in parallel with negoti-
ations on European security. The talks were ostensibly a confidence-building
measure, though in fact they were intended mostly to deflate the significance
of a NATO proposal of similar content formulated at the time. Furthermore,
the foreign ministers sent a draft document to Western governments outlin-
ing proposals for economic, technological-scientific, and cultural cooperation.
Helsinki was accepted as the venue for the conference. Thereafter, the proce-
dure empowering accredited ambassadors to carry out preparatory work in the
Finnish capital became an official proposition.
Last but not least, the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers reiterated at their
meeting in Budapest that the convening of a European security conference
had no preconditions. This was highly significant insofar as Poland, East
Germany, and Czechoslovakia had earlier hoped that the Soviet bloc would
require settlement of the German question as a specific precondition. The
pressure from these countries would have hindered and delayed the process.
However, close cooperation between Soviet and Hungarian officials, coupled
with de facto support from the Romanians, succeeded in circumventing this
possibility.
The conclusion of the Soviet–West German treaty in August 1970 was
a major breakthrough in the struggle to resolve the German issue. After the
treaty was signed, a session of the Warsaw Pact PCC was urgently convened in
Moscow. The only thing that cast a shadow over the breakthrough was Nicolae
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Ceaus¸escu’s proposal suggesting that the time had come for Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary to establish diplomatic relations with the
FRG. The proposal was rejected by the others, including Ka´da´r, who stuck
by the timetable worked out by the Warsaw Pact in December 1969. This
attitude raised some worries in Budapest, where some members of the MSzMP
Political Committee suggested that Hungary should perhaps have seized this
opportunity to settle relations with West Germany.72
The next PCC session, held at the beginning of December 1970 in East
Berlin, was unusual. Meetings at the highest level were held irregularly, and
two in one year was extraordinary. Partly this was because a few days later, the
Polish-FRG treaty was also signed, another significant success on the road to
settling the German issue. At the PCC meeting in East Berlin, the Polish–West
German deal was discussed. After the Polish-FRG treaty was ratified, the Poles
were given permission to enter into diplomatic relations with the FRG as the
first of the four hold-out Warsaw Pact states.73
Strangely enough, the Warsaw diktat prepared in February 1967 was now
set aside by Poland, one of its coauthors, even though only one of the six
points of the secret Warsaw protocol had been met. The official explanation
communicated to the other Warsaw Pact countries was that the Brandt cabinet,
being in a difficult position and attacked by the United States over Ostpolitik,
badly needed to show progress. Ka´da´r had learned unofficially that the FRG
had set this as a precondition for signing the treaty.
This new approach, whose flexibility deviated from earlier principles, was
now accepted by the leaders of the GDR as well, even though East German
leaders had been vehemently opposed to even the planned commencement
of negotiations between Poland and the FRG a year before. However, the
timetable for the three other Soviet-bloc countries that did not yet have diplo-
matic relations with the FRG was reaffirmed. They could normalize their
relations only if the two treaties were ratified, if West German–East German
relations were normalized (including recognition of the GDR in accordance
with international law), and if the FRG acknowledged that the Munich agree-
ment had been invalid from the start.
At the meeting, Brezhnev stressed the need for regular consultations,
particularly during preparations for the European security meeting. Therefore,
he proposed that a CFM be established within the Warsaw Pact. Everyone
72. Minutes of the MSzMP Political Committee, 25 August 1970, in MNL-OL, M-KS. 288, F. 5. cs.
525. o˝.e.




except Ceaus¸escu endorsed the proposal. Ka´da´r strongly endorsed it, not least
because he was the one who had originally raised it during Hungarian-Soviet
bilateral talks. Moreover, Hungarian officials had made considerable efforts at
the beginning of 1970 to establish this consultative body. However, because
Ka´da´r expected a veto by the Romanians, he also suggested a more flexible
solution and proposed that, if the new body could not be established now, an
agreement should be made requiring foreign ministers or their deputies to meet
more frequently in the future for the purpose of conducting consultations.74
In July 1971, after the conference of “European nations” fostered the all-
European security conference held in Brussels by Soviet initiative, Hungarian
leaders also took further steps to promote the idea of the European security
conference. The MSzMP Political Committee adopted a resolution to set
up the Hungarian National Committee of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. The 42 members of the committee were public figures,
scholars, journalists, writers, actors, trade unionists, and church leaders, as well
as ordinary people (e.g., members of cooperative farms). The large size of the
body did not cause any operational concerns inasmuch as Ka´da´r clearly stated
that “an individual will never do anything on his own. They will meet once or
twice.”75
The foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact had another session in Warsaw
from 30 November to 1 December 1971. The main goal was to accelerate
preparations for the European security conference. In the communique´ issued
about the conference, all the participating countries were urged to take prac-
tical steps to allow the conference to begin as early as 1972. In his speech,
Hungarian Foreign Minister Pe´ter responded to the well-known Romanian
position that the conference must not entail negotiations between the two
blocs. Wanting to mediate the different positions within the Warsaw Pact,
Pe´ter stressed the need for multiple levels of negotiation: first, there was a
need for continual negotiation within the blocs insofar as “even within each
bloc and military organization not every member can understand the goals
of the security conference or they do not evaluate it in the same way”; sec-
ond, coordination was required between the blocs; third, the blocs needed to
coordinate preparatory work that involved states outside the blocs insofar as
“every affected country should take part in this work, and the main goal is
to build the issue of security on autonomous and independent states rather
74. See Csaba Be´ke´s, Anna Locher, and Christian Nuenlist, eds., The Records of the Warsaw Pact Deputy
Foreign Ministers (Zurich: Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, 2005.)
75. Minutes of the MSzMP Political Committee, 13 July 1971, in MNL-OL, M-KS. 288, F. 5. cs.
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than on blocs.”76 Pe´ter urged additional consultations within the Warsaw Pact,
especially on the topic of European economic cooperation, suggesting that the
first meeting held in Budapest should be followed by a second meeting in
Warsaw.77
The next important stage in the process of political coordination (which
was rapidly increasing in intensity) within the Warsaw Pact was the Warsaw
Pact PCC session held in Prague in January 1972. The conference produced a
statement calling for the European Conference on Security and Cooperation to
be convened as soon as possible. They accepted the Finnish proposal to begin
preparatory talks at the level of ambassadors, announced they would nominate
representatives, and called on the other European countries to do the same.
They also called on the U.S. and Canadian governments to begin practical
preparations so that multilateral preparatory talks could begin in 1972. The
announcement failed to mention that the major issue of the conference would
be the shaping of future relations with the FRG.
Although the timetable that had been in existence since the Warsaw
diktat (and was later made more precise in December 1969) was softened
at the Moscow PCC session held in August 1970, the participants at that
time unanimously adopted it alongside the modifications made in Moscow.
However, now that the ratification of the two treaties was clearly within reach,
fighting flared up again among the participants, who sought to bolster their
own interests. The available sources reveal five distinct positions —a number
nearly equal to the number of participants.78
1. East German position: diplomatic relations should be established only
if the GDR is admitted to the UN.
2. Czechoslovakian and Soviet position: diplomatic relations should be
established only after the FRG had recognized that the Munich agree-
ment had been invalid since its inception.
3. Polish position: sometime after the ratification, Poland alone would
enter into diplomatic relations with the FRG but would coordinate
this step with the others.
76. Minutes of the MSzMP Political Committee, 14 December 1971, in MNL-OL, M-KS. 288, F.
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4. Hungarian position: after the ratification of the treaties, new negoti-
ations should be conducted: Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria should
settle their relations with Bonn.
5. Romanian position: the four other countries should enter into diplo-
matic relations with the FRG now.
Apparently emboldened by the developments and relying on the support of the
PCC, the GDR submitted another extreme demand that had not been raised
before even as an option: namely, that Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and
Bulgaria should not enter into diplomatic relations until the GDR had been
admitted to the UN.
The Czechoslovak position (shared by the Soviet Union) was that diplo-
matic relations should be established only if the FRG recognized that the
Munich agreement had been invalid since its inception. They took this po-
sition even though Czechoslovak Communist Party First Secretary Gusta´v
Husa´k acknowledged that the situation was likely hopeless and that reaching
such an agreement would likely take a long time. Nonetheless, he suggested
that the PCC (and, first of all, the Soviet Union) make an attempt by putting
political pressure on the FRG. His request that this condition be included in
the PCC statement was accepted.
The Polish position—that sometime after ratification Poland alone would
enter into diplomatic relations with the FRG but would coordinate this step
with the others—was so ambiguous that clarifying what it meant is problematic
even now. Apparently, Edward Gierek deliberately discussed the resolution of
the German issue in vague terms, arguing that although the Poles endorsed
setting invalidation of the Munich agreement as a precondition for normalizing
relations, the FRG’s recognition of the GDR in accordance with international
law would mean the end of normalizing relations with the FRG. Gierek’s
speech suggests that such a step, despite not being included as one of the
preconditions, would be the endpoint of the normalization process.
No wonder Ka´da´r had a hard time interpreting the Polish position when
presenting his report to the MSzMP Political Committee.79 The Hungarian
notes from the PCC session went as far as to interpret the Polish speech as a
step backward, as abandoning the Poles’ earlier promise to the FRG that they
would establish diplomatic relations after ratification.80 However, toward the
end of the Political Committee meeting, Ka´da´r became engaged in a lengthy
79. Report by Ja´nos Ka´da´r at the MSzMP Political Committee meeting, 1 February 1972, in MNL-
OL, M-KS. 288, F. 5. cs. 573. o˝.e.
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exposition. He repeated Gierek’s statement made at the PCC session that
Poland would enter into diplomatic relations with the FRG and coordinate
this step with the other member-states.
The greatest surprise at the Warsaw Pact PCC meeting in Prague in January
1972 was produced by Ka´da´r when he argued that new negotiations should
be conducted after the ratification of the treaties. The Hungarian leader up to
that point had been loyal to the Warsaw Pact timetable and had refrained from
modifying the plan through either bilateral or multilateral channels. Ka´da´r
was probably improvising at the PCC session, for he had no authorization
from the MSzMP Political Committee to submit a new proposal. Perceiving
the nearly anarchic situation and the selfishness of the “fraternal” countries,
he was probably angry that the others abused Hungary’s loyal goodwill. He
likely aimed to delay any chances for Hungary to settle its relations with the
FRG by imposing conditions that clearly could not be fulfilled in the short
term. Sensing that discipline within the bloc had loosened, Ka´da´r believed this
was a great opportunity to test whether the timetable could be modified to
the benefit of Hungary. Reporting to the Warsaw Pact PCC after the MSzMP
Political Committee met, he said: “We were in a phase of the discussion
in which the Poles said that if the treaties are ratified, they will enter into
diplomatic relations. And it was no coincidence that we hooked the two other
carriages on to this. The Poles have a seriously disputed issue, but they will
resolve it by the ratification; the Bulgarians do not have any, and there is no
reason to wait.”81
Ka´da´r told the PCC that immediately after ratification—that is, before
the Czechoslovak-FRG agreement was reached and the GDR was recognized
by Bonn—another consultative PCC meeting should be held to decide about
relations between Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, and the FRG. He stressed that
the dispute about the Munich agreement would last quite long but that some-
thing should be offered to the FRG in return for ratification. The possibility
that Ka´da´r had another, secret motive in this fluid situation is reflected in a
mysterious comment he made about the Munich agreement in his report on
the PCC meeting to the MSzMP Political Committee: “This is not easy from
the Hungarian perspective, either. The annulment of the Munich agreement
also affects Hungary. However, nobody mentions this fact; people just forget
about it.”82 After the Munich agreement, the First Vienna Award established
by the German-Italian Arbitral Tribunal in 1938 had awarded the territories of




southern Slovakia (mostly populated by Hungarians) to Hungary—territories
that had been separated from Hungary by the Trianon peace treaty after
World War I. Ka´da´r drew a logical parallel between the arguments of the FRG
(the award of the Sudeten region to Germany in accordance with the ethnic
principle) and the Hungarian situation. Thus, Hungary’s endorsement of the
Czechoslovak position also meant permanently surrendering any Hungarian
territorial claims against Czechoslovakia. Although Hungarian leaders never
raised the matter openly, the final surrender of the territories populated by
Hungarians was no less a trauma for them than for the Germans, who had
to reconcile their losses of the Polish and Sudeten-German territories. This is
especially true because the Germans were expelled from these territories after
World War II, whereas Hungarians had continued to live in Slovakia.
Ka´da´r was apparently at his best during the Warsaw Pact PCC conference
in Prague. In sharp contrast to his earlier, defensive attitude, he put forward a
“Plan B” to resolve the issue in a favorable way. Emphasizing how important
it was for NATO member-states to recognize the GDR as soon as possible,
he cited the example of France, noting that during recent negotiations in
Budapest the French foreign minister had suggested that France would be
willing to recognize the GDR if Hungary, in return, established diplomatic
relations with the FRG.
In preparation for CSCE, Ka´da´r proposed that a new large-scale cam-
paign be launched to persuade West European countries to accept a start date
in 1972. He called for the PCC to back Finland’s initiative to hold a con-
ference for ambassadors in Helsinki that would prepare for the conference.
The ambassadors or special envoys of the Warsaw Pact states in Helsinki,
he said, should contact the Finnish government on the issue of multilateral
consultation. The Warsaw Pact countries themselves should ensure that they
had a coordinated, well-established position on every important issue of the
security conference, including who would represent them at the preparatory
talks and the security conference itself. In addition, they should propose an
agenda for the conference, taking into consideration any acceptable proposal
submitted by Western countries, and should formulate a position on military
and military-political issues concerning the reduction of arms and troops.
Ka´da´r claimed that further intensive work was needed to elaborate pro-
posals concerning European economic, trade, scientific, technological, and
cultural cooperation. The concrete issues of cooperation relating to the pro-
tection of the human environment needed to be addressed. He also warned
that the NATO countries should be prevented from playing the leading role
in issues pertaining to the exchange of information and increases in tourism.
He stressed that special attention should be devoted to the involvement of
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social organizations that could promote the idea of the security conference
by focusing on, for example, cooperation between Eastern and Western trade
union organizations. In this context, Ka´da´r also mentioned that the conference
convened in Budapest in the fall of 1972 for European mayors would be an
important event.
After the Warsaw Pact PCC conference in Prague, the preparatory work
on the CSCE gathered considerable speed within the Warsaw Pact. From
the beginning, Hungarian leaders attached considerable importance to the
issue of European economic cooperation, the field in which Hungary could
expect the most from a successful conference. Accordingly, as early as April
1970, economic experts held a conference in Budapest. In October 1971, a
detailed summary, prepared on the basis of previous intra-bloc consultations,
was sent to all member-states of the Warsaw Pact. In February 1972, a 26-
page guideline was prepared under the title “The Prospects of Pan-European
Economic Cooperation.” One of the most important suggestions was the
establishment of the European Economic Committee as the body responsible
for European economic cooperation after its proper transformation.83 This
proposal was especially remarkable because the authors of the document were
fully aware that the Soviet Union opposed assigning this body a key role after
the conference.
Puja, the first deputy foreign minister, made several proposals during his
visit to Moscow in March 1972 to speed up work. He proposed to arrange
a Warsaw Pact consultation as soon as possible in order to set up specialist
working groups to address the issues of the free flow of information and the
free movement of people. Furthermore, the documents adopted at the meeting
of foreign ministers in October 1969 in Prague and in June 1970 in Budapest
regarding the objectives and the agenda of the security conference had become
outdated. A new proposal was needed, and Puja urged the leaders to resume
consultations on economic cooperation that had begun earlier in Budapest
and for the Soviet Union to take a position on this topic. As he explained,
this was urgent because the Hungarian party needed a chance to expound the
position of the Warsaw Pact on this issue while intensive negotiations with the
Western countries were being conducted.84
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The Hungarian Foreign Ministry was also working intensively on the
preparations for the CSCE throughout 1972. In the summer of that year, the
idea was raised that if insufficient progress was being made in preparing for
the conference (notably if Western countries were playing for time), Hungary
should issue a unilateral memorandum and try to make progress by publishing
the results of Hungarian diplomacy talks conducted with the Western countries
up to that time.85
At the Crimean meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries on 31 July 1972,
Brezhnev took great pains to forestall the turbulence that had characterized
the January PCC session in Prague on the German issue. He argued that
the FRG after ratifying the two treaties would make additional concessions
only by means of concerted and uniform action. Therefore, with a view to
preventing any serious dispute, he made clear: “If all the socialist countries
were to enter into diplomatic relations with the FRG in the near future, that
would practically mean weakening or even losing one of the most important
tools of influencing Bonn’s policy. This step would further complicate the
position of our German comrades at the talks being conducted with the FRG
at present.” Brezhnev’s remarks could be interpreted as withdrawing the special
permission that had earlier been granted to the Poles.86 On the other hand, his
wording did not actually preclude the option of another Soviet-Polish special
deal, especially since Poland eventually did enter into diplomatic relations with
the FRG in the fall of 1972.
Brezhnev’s warning was, above all, addressed to Ka´da´r, who proposed at
the Warsaw Pact PCC meeting in Prague that, after the ratification of the
two treaties, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria should jointly enter into relations
with the FRG. Ka´da´r never engaged in any open confrontation with the
Soviet Union at multilateral fora. Thus—seeing that his original proposal
would never find support at this forum—he found another trick. Seeing that
Brezhnev made Poland retreat as well, Ka´da´r seemed to side with Brezhnev,
stating that joint action was needed against the FRG in the months to come
because “four beats three” and, “if we remain fewer, the result will not be
the same.” At the same time, in an attempt to convince the FRG to accept
the demands of the Warsaw Pact by joining their forces, he urged that the
deadline be before 22 November, the date when the multilateral East-West
preparatory talks in Helsinki were to begin. In particular, he suggested that the
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Poles should claim they were entering into diplomatic relations as promised
but that they should play for time as long as possible. Ka´da´r’s challenge to
Poland’s privileged position should be viewed in light of the Warsaw diktat
imposed on Hungary by Poland and the GDR in February 1967.
Ka´da´r also advised the Czechoslovak and East German authorities on the
matter. He suggested that they should not make any far-reaching concessions
at the talks but should nonetheless seek other ways to help settle relations,
notably by being more flexible. However, he firmly refused Erich Honecker’s
idea to make UN membership of the GDR a precondition for settling relations
between the FRG and the other socialist countries.
Concerning the general international situation, Ka´da´r expressly stated that
whatever happened in the FRG—that is, even if the opposition were to win
the early elections—the results already achieved could not be undone, and the
Eastern policy of the FRG would stay in place even if the SPD were defeated.
This was especially important, for although Brezhnev was essentially just as
optimistic about the situation, he did not exclude the possibility of restoration,
which in his view would mean returning to the Cold War.
At the Crimean meeting, Ka´da´r called attention to another problem: an
agreement by the two Koreas to reunify peacefully could pose a serious problem
in the European context. Enforcement of the principle of “two political systems
in one country” could not be regarded as a Marxist solution, because “if it was
translated into the German language, Comrade Honecker would perhaps not
subscribe to it, but Barzel or Brandt would promptly sign such an agreement.”87
Over the summer of 1972, preparation for the security conference gained
momentum in the Soviet Union too. That was when the special political
reconciliatory reforms that had fundamentally characterized the CSCE process
were beginning to emerge. By excluding the Romanian factor, the reforms tried
to resolve the issue of multilateral consultations. One such method (often
suggested by Moscow) stressed the need to conduct bilateral negotiations
concurrently. In this spirit, Nikolai Sikachev, head of department at the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, handed over three documents to the Hungarian
Foreign Ministry during his visit to Budapest on 24–25 August. They were
in turn sent to the “closely cooperating” sister parties (i.e., the Warsaw Pact
states, excluding Romania) for their opinion.88
The documents included the following: the draft version of the final com-
munique´ of the conference preparing the Helsinki conference; a document
87. Report by Ja´nos Ka´da´r at the MSzMP Political Committee meeting, 2 August 1972, in MNL-OL,
M-KS. 288, F. 5. cs. 587. o˝.e.
88. Minutes of the MSzMP Political Committee, 5 September 1972, F.
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entitled “General Statement on the Fundamentals of European Security and
the Principles Governing the Relations among European States”; and a reso-
lution on establishing a consultative committee. At a session on 25 September
1972, the MSzMP Political Committee discussed these documents, accepted
the drafts, and proposed to add the following to the general statement:
1. The section on economic cooperation among the European states
was to be supplemented with a statement that efforts should be
made, in the framework of cooperation, to work out a joint solu-
tion attending to the economic tasks affecting all European coun-
tries. Such issues would include: stopping the shortage of energy,
coupling energy systems, linking European water routes, and so
forth.
2. The issues relating to cultural cooperation were to be presented in
a positive way that would stress Hungarian readiness for multilat-
eral cooperation, thus anticipating and neutralizing the Western
demand for “the free flow of people, ideas and information.”
3. The introductory section would touch upon the need for disar-
mament; the statement section should also include the issue of
reducing foreign and national troops stationed in Europe. The
statement should refer to separate talks to be conducted on this
issue. Such a reference was likely to satisfy the neutral and NATO
countries and make the prospect of cooperation with Soviet-bloc
countries more acceptable.
4. The statement should make reference to the results already achieved
by the European countries in consolidating European security.
Mention could also be made of the Soviet-FRG treaty, the Four
Powers agreement on West Berlin, the agreements between the
Soviet Union and France and the Soviet Union and the U.S. on co-
operation, as well as the negotiations conducted by the two German
states.89
Just before the multilateral preparatory talks in Helsinki, a consultative
meeting took place in Moscow on 15 November 1972 for the deputy foreign
ministers of the Warsaw Pact. Nagy attended on behalf of Hungary, submitting
three tactical proposals. First, if the West insisted, the Warsaw Pact should
agree to include environmental issues as a separate item on the agenda. Next,
although the Warsaw Pact should initially firmly reject the matter of the “free
89. Ibid.
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flow of ideas,” a short general sentence might be added to the title of the
second item on the agenda in case the Western countries tried to use this point
as an excuse to drag out the conference. Finally, there was to be a rational
division of labor among the socialist delegations at the meetings.
From 27 November to 1 December 1972, a Soviet state and party delega-
tion conducted negotiations in Hungary. During talks with Brezhnev, Ka´da´r
again raised the issue of diplomatic relations with the FRG, demonstrating
considerable “flexibility” by now saying that he believed Poland had made the
right decision in establishing diplomatic relations with Bonn.90 With a view to
the Czechoslovakian-FRG talks, he again tried to assert that Hungary should
not have to wait until the end of this process: “It is not a good idea to drag
out the establishment of Hungarian–West German diplomatic relations too
much, because such a step might produce just the contrary effect.”91
Brezhnev did not respond to the suggestion but caught his hosts by surprise
when he delivered a general analysis of the international situation. Despite the
results achieved in de´tente, Brezhnev emphatically stated that
Great attention should be devoted to increasing the defensive power of the
Warsaw Treaty. The defensive capability of the national military forces of the
European socialist countries must be increased and provided with modern mil-
itary technology, since there is a clear shortfall in this respect. The defense of
the homeland is the number one issue in the Soviet Union, and accordingly
it has priority over anything else when deciding on the allocation of financial
resources.92
Although the talks on reducing troops in Central Europe—projected to begin
in Vienna a month later—were mentioned only in a general context at the
meeting, Ka´da´r had no doubt, after hearing Brezhnev’s comments, that the
Soviet Union would not take any real steps to reduce armaments. Brezhnev
also promised that the Warsaw Pact PCC would soon convene to discuss the
international situation, as urged by Ka´da´r since the beginning of the year; but,
as it turned out, the session was not held until April 1974.
At the next meeting of foreign ministers in Moscow in January 1973, the
ministers discussed issues relating to Central European arms reduction nego-
tiations and their joint policy concerning the preparation for the European
security conference in Helsinki. The most important development regarding
90. Report by Ja´nos Ka´da´r at the MSzMP Political Committee meeting, 5 December 1972, in MNL-





the Helsinki talks was that the foreign ministers agreed to split the second item
on the agenda into two: the first would focus on trade, economic, and scien-
tific/technological relations; and the second would be concerned with cultural
cooperation, relations between people and organizations, and widening the
scope of information dissemination.93 The modification took place under the
pressure exercised by the Western countries, and the Warsaw Pact member-
states hoped that in this way they could prevent the topic of the free flow of
ideas from becoming a fully separate item on the agenda. Their attempt was a
failure, leaving them with no option but to accept the third basket.
At the meeting, Pe´ter stressed the importance of unified, concerted action
by the socialist countries, arguing that many more intensive bilateral and
multilateral consultations would be required in the future because new issues
regarding the European security conference kept emerging.94 Furthermore, he
warned that the Warsaw Pact states should continue to take the initiative, or
else the Western countries might gain the initiative for themselves.
The ministers worked out a joint position regarding the arms reduction
talks. The key element was that every European state that showed interest in
the issue should be given a chance to participate both in the preparatory talks
and the actual negotiations. The states designated for arms reduction this time
around had not yet been identified, so the ministers did not mention that
Hungary—clearly a Central European country in the geographical sense—
would not participate in the reduction of arms. This issue was critical for some
time at the preparatory talks beginning in Vienna at the end of January 1973.
In principle, the Western countries had every reason to expect that one of
the most centrally located countries of the region would be part of the plan.
(That Hungary—together with Romania and Bulgaria—belonged, militarily
and strategically, to the southern wing of the Warsaw Pact is quite another
matter.) Therefore, the Western states were especially concerned about the
announcement that, of all the socialist countries, only the Soviet Union, the
GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia would participate in the arms reduction.
Hungary would be included only if Italy were also included in the plan.
The NATO states feared that under this solution the Soviet troops stationed
in Czechoslovakia would simply be redeployed on Hungarian territory and
there, in effect, would not be withdrawn from the region.
93. Foreign Ministry report on the conference of the Warsaw Treaty foreign ministers on 15–16
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This solution presented Hungarian leaders with a serious dilemma. Be-
cause Soviet leaders were resolute on this issue, the Hungarians held out little
hope that Moscow could be swayed if the issue of Hungarian participation were
raised. In addition, Hungarian leaders had already been engaged in a serious
dispute with Brezhnev since the beginning of 1972. Their economic reforms
and developments in domestic polity had evoked severe criticism from Soviet
officials, who perceived Hungarian economic policies as developing toward
capitalism. Furthermore, in December 1972 Ka´da´r learned from Brezhnev
that he had no reason to expect any results from the arms reduction talks, at
least not in the short run, and that these negotiations were necessary only to
ensure the success of the European security conference.
Ka´da´r himself had been confronted with a similar dilemma before. In
1958, Khrushchev had suggested that Soviet troops might pull out of Hungary
concurrently with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania. At that time,
Ka´da´r thought the move would be premature and would jeopardize his efforts
to consolidate an internal situation that was still unstable in the wake of the
1956 revolution. He thus rejected the offer.95 The offer itself was kept secret
so that Hungarians would not be angry at Ka´da´r for his rejection of it. By
1973, however, the situation was quite different. After 15 November 1972 the
proposal set out in the NATO note regarding the inclusion of Hungary became
widely known. Thus, Hungarian leaders faced the difficult task of explaining
to the public why they were not interested in reducing military expenditures
or in a partial withdrawal of Soviet troops.
During the preparatory talks in Helsinki, Hungary—using “constructive
loyalty,” the key principle of Hungarian foreign policy—actively participated
in the work, constantly negotiating with the USSR and other Warsaw Pact
member-states. Using a policy contrary to that of the Romanians, the Hun-
garians did not aim for any spectacular action and instead tried to mediate
between the two camps in a quiet, flexible way. They made efforts to popular-
ize the position of the Warsaw Pact at the talks conducted with the Western
countries. Meanwhile, within the Eastern bloc they tried their best to sell any
reasonable Western proposal that seemed acceptable. Accordingly, at the con-
ference held in Moscow on 21–22 May 1973 among the Warsaw Pact deputy
foreign ministers, Puja stressed that serious disputes should be expected from
the talks in Helsinki but that there was nothing to be gained by focusing on
those disputes. Instead, he suggested that the socialist countries continue to
95. See Be´ke´s, “Titkos va´lsa´gkezele´sto˝l a politikai koordina´cio´ig,” pp. 24–25.
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hold bilateral talks with EC and neutral countries, because that was the best
way to influence those countries’ position.
Before the first phase of CSCE that began in July 1973 in Helsinki, the
MSzMP and the Hungarian government adopted guidelines for the speech to
be given by Foreign Minister Pe´ter. Besides general statements about Hun-
gary’s interest in easing tensions in international relations and increasing in-
ternational cooperation, Pe´ter’s speech stressed that the establishment of a
consultative body would be especially important for economic and cultural
cooperation. As far as economic cooperation was concerned, the speech called
for the elimination of trade discrimination and argued that the elaboration and
implementation of plans requiring European collaboration played a key role
in raising the living standard of European countries. The speech also empha-
sized that industrial cooperation between countries from opposing political
systems, and not just trade relations, provided a more secure guarantee against
new tensions. The relevant experience Hungary had gained in this area had to
be presented to the conference.
As for the third item on the agenda, Pe´ter’s speech emphasized the cultural
and educational relations portion of the topic in order to prove that the culture
of the socialist countries and the results they had achieved in educating young
people could present countries of an opposing political system with useful
experience.
Echoing the general optimism in the Soviet bloc after the Geneva summit
in July 1955, Hungary asserted that every remnant of the Cold War must
be eradicated from the relations between countries. As for human relations,
Hungarian data on the experience of the Soviet-bloc countries “supported the
expansion of relations between people and organizations in every respect and
[showed that such expansion] had always played a key role in easing cold war
tensions.”96
Eventually, the next conference of the Warsaw Pact PCC was convened
until April 1974 in Moscow—despite Brezhnev’s repeated promise that it
would take place as early as 1972. Joining Brezhnev’s position, Ka´da´r at the
meeting stated with satisfaction that the socialist countries through their joint
action had practically achieved everything they had wanted in resolving the
German issue.97 He explained that a decisive turn for de´tente had taken
place in the international situation and expressed his conviction that peaceful
96. Minutes of the MSzMP Political Committee, 19 June 1973, in MNL-OL, M-KS. 288, F. 5. cs.
613. o˝.e.
97. Report by Ja´nos Ka´da´r at the MSzMP Political Committee meeting, 23 April 1974, in MNL-OL,
M-KS. 288, F. 5. cs. 635. o˝.e.
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coexistence was a historically inevitable process. However, the opponents of
de´tente in Western countries had recently become active, and the Communist
states needed to do everything they could to preserve what had already been
achieved. Since the Vienna talks, representatives of the Western countries had
from time to time raised the idea of a reduction of military forces that would
encompass Hungary. With the purpose of reassuring the Soviet Union, Ka´da´r
made a point to confirm that the Hungarian position was unchanged: Hungary
would participate in the reduction only if Italy was also included.
Obviously aware of the Soviet-Romanian agreement made in the mean-
time, Ka´da´r resubmitted his former proposal to establish the Council of Foreign
Ministers. Giving up the veto on which he had insisted for so long, Ceaus¸escu
agreed this time to establish the council, which officially began its work in
1976.
Of all the speeches delivered at the summit meeting held from 30 July to
1 August 1975 to sign the Helsinki Final Act, Ka´da´r’s speech was one of the
most remarkable contributions. Among the socialist countries, Ka´da´r spoke
in greatest detail about the issues in the third basket as well as the topic of
European cooperation. The latter was greatly appreciated and cited by the
contemporary Western press. Ka´da´r devoted roughly one-third of his speech
to cultural cooperation and exchange of information, doing so in a positive
manner. He used convincing-sounding data to convey Hungary’s interest in
facilitating foreign travel and personal interactions. He stated that each year
eight million visitors came to Hungary, a country of ten million inhabitants,
and more than three million Hungarians traveled abroad.
In another striking aspect of his speech, Ka´da´r strongly emphasized the
attachment of Hungary to Europe. What was truly unprecedented was that
the Hungarian Communist leader spoke openly about the Trianon syndrome,
explaining that Hungary had lost two-thirds of its territory after World War
I.98 All those present knew that the majority of the territory cut off from
Hungary had been taken by four neighboring countries, all of which had
come under Communist rule in the 1940s, and three of which were members
of the Warsaw Pact.
Hungarian leaders remained active after signing the Helsinki Final Act.
The MSzMP Political Committee adopted a detailed resolution at its session
on 15 August 1975 concerning the near-term obligations that derived from
98. The peace treaty signed in the Grand Trianon palace in Versailles in June 1920 deprived Hungary
of two thirds of its territory and one third of its Hungarian population.
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signing the Final Act.99 The resolution stemmed from Hungarian leaders’ view
that they were in a relatively good position to apply the provisions contained
in the Final Act and could therefore “actively and offensively” act in the field
of bilateral relations. In accordance with the resolution, Hungarian officials
were instructed to work out proposals for the development of economic and
cultural relations with Western states, and preparations had to begin promptly
for a series of talks to be held in Belgrade in June 1977. Shortly afterward the
party published 100,000 copies of Ka´da´r’s speech and the full text of the Final
Act.100
Hungary ostensibly benefited most from the security conference in the
Soviet bloc, as well as from the evolving rapprochement. The success of the
Helsinki process provided an excellent opportunity for Hungary to pursue
closer relations with the West, which became crucial for the country’s eco-
nomic well-being. The post-Helsinki human rights campaign initiated by the
U.S. government under Jimmy Carter affected Hungary the least among the
Warsaw Pact states. Moreover, the continual appraisal by the West at Helsinki
review conferences led to an upgrading of conditions in Hungary. The Hun-
garian government was quick to take advantage of the situation. In 1976,
when a “package” of proposals was dispatched to nineteen Western countries
(including the United States) calling for intensive development of bilateral, po-
litical, economic, and cultural cooperation, Hungary was the only Soviet-bloc
country to participate.101
Consequently, Hungarian relations with the West markedly improved,
and from the second half of the 1970s onward a series of visits on the high-
est level followed. In 1977 Ka´da´r visited Bonn and Rome, and in 1978 he
traveled to Paris. In 1977 French Prime Minister Raymond Barre paid a visit
to Hungary, as did West German Chancellor Schmidt in 1979. At the CSCE
review conferences in Belgrade, Madrid, and Vienna, Hungarian diplomats
played an increasingly active role. Fittingly, the only follow-up conference that
took place in a Warsaw Pact state was the European Cultural Forum, held in
Budapest in 1985.
99. Minutes of the HSWP Political Committee, 12 August 1975, in MNL-OL, M-KS. 288, F. 5. cs.
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